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I1. C ONCLUSION ............................................................... 40
The educational enterprise of the American law school operates
by way of broad agreements between the parties in interest. Such
agreements, no matter their precise form, may be categorized by
the identity of the participants, as agreements: (1) between govern-
ing bodies like the American Bar Association ("ABA") and the law
school; (2) between the law school and its professors; (3) between
the law school and its students; and (4) between the professors and
their students.
The agreements between these parties take many different
forms. Some are handed down from above and some are negotiated;
some are signed and some are not; some are written and some are
pledged orally. These agreements create different relationships be-
tween the parties based in part on their origins and forms.
Of all such agreements, the democratic ideal is best represented
by the contract. The private law created by a contract "is demo-
cratic because a traditional contract must be the agreement of both
parties."1 The parties to a contract "objectively manifest their mu-
tual intent to be bound to a specific relationship,'2 and such mutual
consent is "central to the democratic character of traditional con-
tracts."3 Because the traditional contract binds only the makers of
that agreement, "contractual law embodies the democratic ideal of
government by and with the consent of all the governed."
4
In a time of increased anti-democratic sentiment and governance
in the United States and abroad, it is surely sensible and wise to
examine the underlying democracy (or lack thereof) in our daily re-
lationships. For many of the readers of this article, such daily life
is largely conducted at American law schools.
This article will consider each of the numerous agreements that
underlie the functioning of the American law school in terms of con-
tract requirements under both the Restatement (Second) of the Law
1. W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking
Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 530 (1971); see also HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW
AND STATE 311 (1945) ("[T]he contractual creation of law is a democratic procedure."); F. Eric
Fryar, Common-Law Due Process Rights in the Law of Contracts, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1021, 1025
(1988) ("Contracts are an extremely democratic form of law.") (citing E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS § 1.2, at 6 (1982) ("[T]he terms of such direct bilateral exchanges are arrived at
voluntarily ... Each party to an exchange seeks to maximize his own economic advantage on
terms tolerable to the other party.")).
2. Fryar, supra note 1 (citing Wendell H. Holmes, The Freedom Not o Contract, 60 TUL.
L. REV. 751, 751 (1986)).
3. James W. Fox Jr., Relational Contract Theory and Democratic Citizenship, 54 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 1, 56 (2003).
4. Fryar, supra note 1 (citing Slawson, supra note 1).
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of Contracts5 and the leading theories of contract6 to determine
which, if any, of these agreements rise to the level of a genuine dem-
ocratic contract between the parties in interest.
I. CONTRACTS
A. Contract Requirements
In order to analyze how agreements in the American law school
context measure up to genuine, enforceable, democratic contracts,
it is first necessary to briefly remind ourselves of the required ele-
ments of contract formation. The law school agreements discussed
in Part II will then be analyzed in terms of these requirements to
see whether or not they amount to contracts.
Jurisdictions differ with respect to what is necessary to form a
contract.7 However, the classic requirements include the following:




The Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines an offer as "the
manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to
justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bar-
gain is invited and will conclude it." A "mere expression of inten-
tion or general willingness to do something" does not amount to an
offer.10 "An offer must be definite and certain,"1 1 although it "may
be made by words, acts, or conduct."12 An offer "is ordinarily a
promise, [and therefore] it will typically look to the future."13 Un-
less a statement made by the offeree "gives the person to whom it
5. These requirements are Offer, Acceptance, Consideration, and Mutual Intent. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 17, 24, 50, 71 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
6. The theories to be discussed infra include: (1) contract as promise; (2) contract as
consent; and (3) contract as economic efficiency.
7. See 17A Am. JUR. 2D Contracts § 18 (2018) (collecting elements of a valid contract in
different jurisdictions).
8. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. United States, 153 F.3d 1375, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(the formation of a contract requires "1) mutuality of intent to contract; 2) consideration; and,
3) lack of ambiguity in offer and acceptance.") (quoting City of El Centro v. United States,
922 F.2d 816, 820 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
10. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 46 (2018).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 4:7 (4th ed. 2018).
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is addressed an assurance that.., that person may conclude a bar-
gain, the statement is not an offer."
14
2. Acceptance
Acceptance of an offer is defined as "a manifestation of assent o
the terms thereof made by the offeree in a manner invited or re-
quired by the offer. ' 15 Acceptance is required in order to form a
contract, and "[t]he effect of acceptance is to convert the offer into a
binding contract."16 The acceptance of an offer "must be communi-
cated to the offeror; a mere secret intent to accept or assent is not
sufficient."17 Acceptance of an offer is required to create a contract
because "it takes two to make a bargain.
18
3. Consideration
Consideration consists of a bargained-for performance or return
promise.19 Such a "performance or return promise is bargained for
if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is
given by the promisee in exchange for that promise.'20 A contract
cannot exist without sufficient consideration.21 Such consideration
"may be a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee. It
may take the form of a right, interest, or profit accruing to one
party, or some forbearance, detriment, or responsibility given, suf-
fered, or undertaken by the other ... [or the] creation, modification,
or destruction of a legal relation."22 Consideration is "the exchange
or price requested and received by the promisor for its promise."
23
Consideration "distinguishes a contract from a gift."
24
4. Mutual Intent
Contract formation also requires "a manifestation of mutual as-
sent to the exchange."25 This element of mutual intent "is some-
times referred to as a 'meeting of the minds."'26 Such a meeting of
14. Id.
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 50 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
16. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 65 (2018).
17. Id. § 68.
18. 2 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 6:1 (4th ed. 2018).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
20. Id.
21. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 101 (2018).
22. Id.
23. 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 7:2 (4th ed. 2018).
24. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 101 (2018).
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
26. Id.
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the minds must occur "at the same time, on all the essential ele-
ments or terms to form a binding contract."27 Which terms are es-
sential "depends on the agreement and its context and also on the
subsequent conduct of the parties."28 It should be further noted
that, "although often treated as a distinct element for a contract, a
meeting of the minds is a component of both offer and acceptance,
measured by what the parties said and did, and not on their subjec-
tive state of mind.129 Furthermore, "mutual assent to enter a con-
tract is ... normally manifested by an offer and acceptance."30 That
is to say, following an offer, "an acceptance of the proposal or offer
completes the manifestation of assent."
31
B. Contract Theory
To further our understanding of contracts and their underlying
principles, it is also helpful to discuss what legal scholars consider
to be the historical, commercial, and philosophical underpinnings
of contract law. These theories will then be applied to the series of
law school agreements considered here to help us understand
whether, and in what ways, those agreements amount to contracts.
Contracts are one of the earliest forms of private law, their basic
tenets and philosophical underpinnings laid out in Plato's Laws,
written in the 4th Century B.C.E.,32 Roman,33 Medieval,34 early
Common Law,35 and Civil Law36 also incorporated principles and
rules of contract law. From the broadest perspective, the law en-
forces private agreements such as contracts in order to "enable peo-
ple to rely on them as a rule and thus make the path of enterprise
more secure." 37 Indeed, contract law in its most general formula-
tion can be compared to an overarching infrastructure: "its most
important societal role is to supply frameworks for cooperative ac-
27. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 29 (2018).
28. Id.
29. Id. § 31.
30. Id.
31. 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 4:3 (4th ed. 2018).
32. PLATO, THE LAWS, Book XI, § 23, at 460 (Trevor J. Saunders ed., Penguin Classics
1975) (c. 360 B.C.E.).
33. See DIAN TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & DAVID GRUNING, 24 LA. CIV. L. TREATISE, Sales § 1:1
(2017).
34. See James Oldham, Reinterpretations of 18th-Century English Contract Theory: The
View from Lord Mansfield's Trial Notes, 76 GEO. L.J. 1949, 1950-58 (1988).
35. See Clinton W. Francis, The Structure of Judicial Administration and the Develop-
ment of Contract Law in Seventeenth-Century England, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 35, 36-37 (1983).
36. See Richard R.W. Brooks & Alexander Stremitzer, Remedies On and Off Contract,
120 YALE L.J. 690, 695 (2011).
37. Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 591 (1933).
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tivity. Like the proper functioning of say, a highway, contract de-
pends not only on written rules of the road, but also on the reliabil-
ity of contextual practices."38 Beyond such broad descriptions, mod-
ern scholars have offered many theories considering the philosoph-
ical underpinnings of contract law.3 9 For purposes of this analysis,
we will focus on the three most broadly accepted theories (which
also happen to be most directly related to the law school contractual
relationships that this article describes): (1) Promise; (2) Consent;
and (3) Economic Efficiency.
1. Contract as Promise
The classical promise theory of contract is based on the moral and
political principle that individuals have rights, which they are per-
mitted to dispose of as they choose,40 and the state and the courts
are bound to respect the obligations individuals impose upon them-
selves.41 Charles Fried, in his important 1981 book Contract as
Promise, argues that "promise is morally binding because it is the
willing invocation by a free moral agent of a convention that allows
him to bind his will."4 2 Fried prioritizes the moral argument that
"to refuse to recognize, or to interfere with, a person's free choice is
to refuse him the respect of treating him as an autonomous moral
agent.43 In this, he rejects the contrary scholarly argument that
collective and paternalistic judgments about the individual's best
interests may be more accurate than the individual's own analy-
sis.4 4 Instead, Fried sets out the theory that the introduction of
such agreements assures one's ability to use others' work for one's
own purposes, and that this trust became a "powerful tool for our
38. Roy Kreitner, Fear of Contract, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 429, 430 (2004).
39. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269,
271-91 (1986) (discussing the will, reliance, efficiency, fairness, and bargain theories of con-
tract, and introducing the "consent theory"); Efi Zemach & Omri Ben-Zvi, Contract Theory
and the Limits of Reason, 52 TULSA L. REV. 167, 179-213 (2017) (addressing and critiquing
by means of "legal aesthetics" the promissory, reliance, economic efficiency, and pluralist
conceptions of contract).
40. Michigan Law Review Association, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Ob-
ligation. by Charles Fried. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1981. Pp. 162. $14.,
81 MICH. L. REV. 904, 904 (1983).
41. P. S. Atiyan, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation. By Charles
Fried. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1981. Pp. 162. $14.00, 95 HARV. L. REV.
509, 509 (1981); see also Michigan Law Review Association, supra note 40.
42. Charles Fried, Contract as Promise Thirty Years On, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 961, 972-
73 (2012).
43. Atiyan, supra note 41, at 523.
44. Id. at 523-24.
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working our mutual wills in the world."45 Promise, under this the-
ory, "is a kind of moral invention: it allows persons to create obliga-
tion where there was none before and thus give free individuals a
facility for extending their reach by enlisting the reliable collabora-
tion of other free persons."46 Promise "implies more than a commu-
nication of intention (which we are free to change, though others
may be injured); it implies a commitment to a future course of con-
duct."
47
2. Contract as Consent
Randy Barnett's consent theory of contract begins with the earli-
est of human interactions, based on the obligatory allocation of
scarce natural resources.48 Under this theory, certain agreements
are legally binding because the parties to the transaction bring cer-
tain rights and then "manifest their assent to the transfer of these
rights."49 Contract law thus "concerns enforceable obligations aris-
ing from the valid transfer of entitlements that are already vested
in someone,' 50 and any legally enforceable obligation that results is
based on the parties' original voluntary consent.51 Although the
consent theory of contract contains some broad parallels to Fried's
promise theory, Barnett notes that a promisor "may have a moral
obligation to do what she promised . . . [but] [w]ithout more she
would not have a legal obligation .... "52 Only when the promisor
45. Michigan Law Review Association, supra note 40, at 904-05 (quoting CHARLES FRIED,
CONTRACT As PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 8 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2d.
ed. 2015) (1981)).
46. Fried, supra note 42, at 962.
47. Michigan Law Review Association, supra note 40, at 905; but see Nicolas Cornell, A
Complainant-Oriented Approach to Unconscionability and Contract Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
1131, 1175 n.144 (2016) (noting that "the conception of promises as normative and contract
as purely remedial ... seems to motivate Lipshaw ... who argues that promise and contract
are separate because the former concerns obligations and the latter concerns consequences.
... Lipshaw does not maintain that there could be contracts without promises, but he insists
that contract law is not addressed to the moral question of obligation.") (citing Jeffrey M.
Lipshaw, Duty and Consequence: A Non-conflating Theory of Promise and Contract, 36 CUMB.
L. REV. 321, 327 (2006)).
48. Barnett, supra note 39, at 294.
49. Id. at 319.
50. Id. at 297; see also id. at 270 ("Properly understood, contract law is that part of a
system of entitlements that identifies those circumstances in which entitlements are validly
transferred from person to person by their consent. Consent is the moral component that
distinguishes valid from invalid transfers of alienable rights.").
51. Id. at 300.
52. Id. at 305; see also Randy E. Barnett, Contract Is Not Promise; Contract Is Consent,
45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 647, 655 (2012) ("To promise is to commit to do or refrain from doing
something. To consent to contract is to commit to be legally responsible for nonperformance
of a promise. So consent is a commitment in addition to whatever moral commitment inheres
in a promise.").
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manifests her consent to be legally bound does she incur a contrac-
tual obligation.
53
3. Contract as Efficiency
The efficiency theory of contract, as laid out recently by Alan
Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, follows an economic analysis of con-
tract negotiation, formation, and interpretation,54 arguing that con-
tract law "should facilitate the efforts of contracting parties to max-
imize the joint gains ... from transactions.'" 55 Contract law should
"restrict itself to the pursuit of efficiency alone,"5 6 under the simple
premise that "the state should choose the rules that regulate com-
mercial transactions according to the criterion of welfare maximi-
zation.' '57 In this vein, efficiency refers to "the relationship between
the aggregate benefits of a situation and the aggregate costs of the
situation.58 The efficiency theory of contract is thus utilitarian,
"concerned with promoting rules that enhance societal wealth and
utility." 59 The literature interpreting contract in economic terms is
extensive and takes many forms, including normative, descriptive,
and interpretative models.60 However, all economic contractual
53. Barnett, supra note 39, at 305; see also Barnett, supra note 52, at 647 ("Rather than
embodying the morality of promise-keeping, the enforcement of contracts can best be ex-
plained and justified as a product of the parties' consent to be legally bound."). Jeffrey M.
Lipshaw analyzes this split between the original promise and the subsequent legal contract,
arguing that contracts "are constructs of a system of law, whereby the state agrees to enforce
certain promises entered into in a certain form .... [T]here is nothing moral about the con-
tract versus the underlying promise and . . . the conflation of the two is the source of the
confusion over the limits of the law of contract. The moral or transcendental aspect of the
contract is the underlying promise-its soul, so to speak-but the law can only doctor its
body-what shows in the contract." Lipshaw, supra note 47, at 323.
54. Schwartz and Scott are explicit that their theory applies only to contracts between
"firms," defined as corporations with five or more employees, limited partnerships, and pro-
fessional partnerships such as law and accounting firms. Alan Schwartz & Robert E.
Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 545 (2003). Con-
tracts between other types of parties, they argue, should be the province of, inter alia, con-
sumer, real property, securities, employment, and family law. Id. at 544. As one scholar has
noted: "So limiting the theory's domain makes an economic analysis more plausible." Steven
J. Burton, A Lesson on Some Limits of Economic Analysis: Schwartz and Scott on Contract
Interpretation, 88 IND. L.J. 339, 345 (2013).
55. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 54, at 544.
56. Id. at 545.
57. Id. at 544.
58. Barnett, supra note 39, at 277 (quoting A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION
TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 (1983)).
59. Samuel F. Ernst, Pluralism Applied: A Concordant Approach to Selecting Contract
Rules, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 87, 87 (2017).
60. Zemach & Ben-Zvi, supra note 39, at 200 ("Normative economic analysis strives to
identify and recommend the most efficient doctrinal rule, while descriptive economic theories
hold that existing contract doctrine is best seen as serving the goal of maximizing wel-
fare. An interpretive economic theory ... combines normative and descriptive elements.").
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analysis in essence considers whether or not contracts maximize ef-
ficiency and what incentives they create for the parties, making
contract "a vehicle for maximizing individual and social gains."
6 1
II. LAW SCHOOL AGREEMENTS
In this section, we will analyze a series of agreements in the
American law school context, by way of the required elements of a
contract and the main academic theories of contract, in order to de-
termine which, if any, of these agreements amount to a genuine,
negotiated, democratic contract.
A. Agreements Between Governing Bodies and Law Schools
This section will consider federal learning accommodations re-
quirements under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"). It will then analyze learning
outcomes provisions under revised ABA standard 302 and the new
"active learning" obligations laid out under ABA standard 304(c).
1. Learning Accommodations
Under the Rehabilitation Act of 197362 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990,63 educational institutions, including law
schools, are required to make reasonable accommodations for oth-
erwise qualified students with disabilities.6 4 The 2008 amendments
to the ADA made clear that the definition of "disability" is to be
broadly understood,6 5 and although these amendments were in-
tended to clarify matters, discussions and disagreements have con-
tinued.66
Under the definitions laid out in the Rehabilitation Act and the
ADA, one scholar recently estimated that "approximately one in five
61. Id. at 201.
62. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797(a) (1994)).
63. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 706, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, 47 U.S.C. §§ 152, 221, 611 (1994)).
64. Alexis Anderson & Norah Wylie, Beyond the ADA: How Clinics Can Assist Law Stu-
dents with "Non-Visible" Disabilities to Bridge the Accommodations Gap Between Classroom
and Practice, 15 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 3 (2008).
65. Laura Rothstein, Forty Years of Disability Policy in Legal Education and the Legal
Profession: What Has Changed and What Are the New Issues?, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y & L. 519, 528 (2014) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2012)).
66. Id. at 546; see also id. at 557 ("The 2008 amendments further clarify that 'reasonable
modifications.., shall be required, unless an entity can demonstrate that making such mod-
ifications . . . would fundamentally alter the nature of the goods, services, facilities, privi-
leges, advantages, or accommodations involved."') (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2012)).
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Americans has a condition that would be considered a protected dis-
ability."67 In the law school context, studies suggest that "approxi-
mately ten percent of law students possess a physical or mental dis-
ability,"68 while the number of students seeking accommodations is
rapidly increasing.6 9 Such accommodations are increasingly sought
not just for physical disabilities, but also for a range of cognitive,
mental health, and learning disabilities.70 Law schools have re-
sponded by instituting protocols for addressing student disabilities
in compliance with the law and by hiring administrators to oversee
disability responses.71 Common protocols adopted include provid-
ing administrative assistance, relieving students of certain require-
ments, or providing extra time to complete required tasks.72
However, such accommodations are not always implemented
without issue. Most disability decisions in the law school context
are the result of a case-by-case analysis, without the benefit of ad-
ministrative proceedings or litigation, "and with only the guidance
of elastic and elusive statutory and regulatory standards.'73 Alexis
Anderson and Norah Wylie have laid out a number of issues with
disabilities and accommodations in the law school context, includ-
ing, inter alia: (1) student under-reporting of disabilities out of
shame or fear of discrimination; (2) faculty's lack of training to as-
sist students with disabilities; (3) disability accommodations rais-
ing equity issues for other students in the same classes; (4) lack of
appropriate career counseling for disabled students; (5) absence of
adequate training for disabled students regarding how to work and
succeed in practice.74 Others have pointed to the increasing concern
67. Id. at 545.
68. Kevin H. Smith, Disabilities, Law Schools, and Law Students: A Proactive and Ho-
listic Approach, 32 AKRON L. REV. 1, 1 (1999) (citing Laura F. Rothstein, Disability Issues in
Legal Education: A Symposium, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 301, 305 (1991); Laura F. Rothstein, Stu-
dents, Staff and Faculty with Disabilities: Current Issues for Colleges and Universities, 17
J.C. & U.L. 471, 471 (1991)); see also Anderson & Wylie, supra note 64, at 6 ("[S]tudies have
shown a steady increase in the number of law students with disabilities since passage of the
ADA.").
69. Smith, supra note 68; see also Anderson & Wylie, supra note 64, at 6.
70. Anderson & Wylie, supra note 64, at 4 (citing Scott Weiss, Contemplating Greatness:
Learning Disabilities and the Practice of Law, 6 SCHOLAR 219, 220 (2004); Donald Stone, The
Impact of Americans with Disabilities Act on Legal Education and Academic Modifications
for Disabled Law Students: An Empirical Study, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 567, 570 (1996)).
71. Anderson & Wylie, supra note 64, at 6.
72. Smith, supra note 68, at 64; see also Anderson & Wylie, supra note 64, at 4 ("Note-
takers, special testing and attendance rules, and access to academic support programs are
common features of most law schools' disability law protocols."); Rothstein, supra note 65, at
556-57 ("Two primary types of reasonable accommodations are available for individuals: the
provision of auxiliary aids and services; and the modification of policies, practices, and pro-
cedures.").
73. Smith, supra note 68, at 2.
74. Anderson & Wylie, supra note 64, at 15-16.
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about stress and its impacts on students in general and law stu-
dents in particular.
75
Some scholars have suggested that, although law schools are not
required to proactively identify and reach out to students with dis-
abilities, law schools would best serve themselves and their stu-
dents by implementing appropriate outreach, starting from the ad-
missions process and continuing through orientation, classes, and
exam administration.76 The experiences of the increasing number
of law students with disabilities are strongly affected by faculty at-
titudes, faculty approaches, and law school policies and proce-
dures.77 The measure of reasonable accommodation, writes Kevin
Smith, should be whether the law school "acts proactively to assist
the student in constructing an individualized, comprehensive ac-
commodation program which takes into account the student's long-
term educational, personal, and professional best interests."78
Learning accommodations requirements are handed down from
the federal government to all American law schools. They are not
the product of an offer from the government, nor of an acceptance
on the part of the law schools, which are required by law to abide
by the terms of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. There is no
bargained-for performance or return promise, and therefore no con-
sideration. And because there is no offer or acceptance, there is no
mutual intent. Therefore, learning accommodations are not con-
tracts under the terms of the Restatement, but are closer to regula-
tions handed down from above that must be followed. Even to the
extent a contract could be found here, it would be a contract of ad-
hesion, defined as one "usually prepared in printed form, drafted
unilaterally by the dominant party and then presented on a take it
or leave it basis to the weaker party who has no real opportunity to
bargain about its terms.
'79
75. Rothstein, supra note 65, at 594 ("More attention is being paid to what to do about
the impact of stress during law school. One of the major concerns beyond recognition of the
need to do more is the availability and affordability of mental health services and whether
such treatment will remain confidential.").
76. Id. at 574.
77. Id. at 601-02.
78. Smith, supra note 68, at 106. It should be noted, however, that the creation of any
individualized plan for student accommodations relies on the professor's knowledge of the
disability, which is often kept private by law school policy. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 70, at
574 ("Law faculty presumably carry the same misunderstandings about persons with disa-
bilities." According to at least one law school official, in order to protect student anonymity,
professors have no knowledge of the disabilities of their students.).
79. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 274 (2018) ("Contracts of adhesion are enforceable un-
less they are unconscionable, and the presence of an adhesion contract alone does not require
a finding of procedural unconscionability. Nevertheless, the fact that a contract is one of ad-
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In terms of contract theory, learning accommodations require-
ments do not fall under either the promise or consent theories,80
because learning accommodations are not the result of any prom-
ises between or consent of the parties-or even any negotiation be-
tween them. In sum, the relationship between the federal govern-
ment and law schools regarding learning accommodations is not
contractual at all, but regulatory, with the rules being handed down
from the government for the law schools to implement.
2. Learning Outcomes
In 2014, the ABA, responding to what some have called the "drum
beat" of a new emphasis on the assessment of student learning out-
comes in American legal education,81 revised its law school accred-
itation standards to require the establishment of learning out-
comes,8 2 the monitoring of student learning, and the self-evaluation
of law programs to ensure graduates' achievement of the core com-
petencies of the professional lawyer.8 3 These revisions (the "Re-
vised Standards") "are extensive and, for the first time, draw explic-
itly from education and learning theory to focus on what students
are learning as opposed to what law schools teach."8 4 The revised
ABA standard 302 sets forth the minimum requirements for accred-
ited law schools:8
5
hesion is a strong indicator that the contract is procedurally unconscionable because it sug-
gests an absence of meaningful choice. Therefore, courts determining the validity of a con-
tract often begin with assessing whether the contract is one of adhesion.").
80. However, it must be noted that learning accommodations are clearly the result of an
attempt by the federal government to implement economic efficiency. Further, the resulting
efforts by American law schools to implement these requirements are also "a vehicle for max-
imizing individual and social gains." Zemach & Ben-Zvi, supra note 39, at 201.
81. Mary Crossley & Lu-in Wang, Learning by Doing: An Experience with Outcomes As-
sessment, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 269, 269 (2010); see also id. at 270 ("[A] system of assessing
student learning outcomes seeks to measure how well a population of students is accomplish-
ing stated objectives and, accordingly, how effectively the institution is supporting them in
achieving those objectives.").
82. Sarah Valentine, Flourish or Founder: The New Regulatory Regime in Legal Educa-
tion, 44 J.L. & EDUC. 473, 508 (2015).
83. Charles P. Cercone & Adam Lamparello, Assessing A Law School's Program of Legal
Education to Comply with the American Bar Association's Revised Standards and Maximize
Student Attainment of Core Lawyering Competencies, 86 UMKC L. REV. 37, 42 (2017).
84. Valentine, supra note 82, at 507; see also Cara Cunningham Warren, Achieving the
American Bar Association's Pedagogy Mandate: Empowerment in the Midst of A 'Perfect
Storm", 14 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 67, 67-68 (2014) ("The American Bar Association's ... peda-
gogy mandate ... marks a 'quantum shift' in legal education, moving its center from teaching
to learning and from curriculum to outcomes (i.e., 'from what is delivered to students to what
students take away from their educational experience').") (footnotes omitted).
85. Valentine, supra note 82.
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Standard 302. LEARNING OUTCOMES
A law school shall establish learning outcomes that shall, at a
minimum, include competency in the following:
(a) Knowledge and understanding of substantive and proce-
dural law;
(b) Legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, problem-solv-
ing, and written and oral communication in the legal context;
(c) Exercise of proper professional and ethical responsibilities
to clients and the legal system; and
(d) Other professional skills needed for competent and ethical
participation as a member of the legal profession.
86
These new requirements mark a significant change of opinion re-
garding the proper framework of legal education on the part of the
ABA and the legal academy more generally.8 7
In practice, every law school now must articulate clearly, in writ-
ing, what its students should be capable of upon graduation-its
desired "learning outcomes.188 Then the school must determine how
it will assess its students' success at achieving these outcomes.
8 9
Such assessment "relies on [identifying], and if necessary, changing
teaching methods and inputs to ensure student success in meeting
learning objectives. It replaces the mystique of [the] Socratic ap-
proach with transparency about learning objectives and teaching
methods."90 Under this framework, "the role of the professor is not
to deliver information but to design effective learning experiences
so that students achieve the course outcomes."91
86. Id. at 509 (quoting STANDARDS & RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW
SCHOOLS, PROGRAM OF LEGAL EDUCATION § 302 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2014)).
87. See, e.g., Crossley & Wang, supra note 81 ("In comparison to other realms of profes-
sional education, legal education has remained fairly naive about the idea that schools should
seek to assess whether their students, as a group, are achieving the educational objectives
embraced by the school.").
88. Id. at 270.
89. Id. at 271.
90. Warren, supra note 84, at 68-69 (first alteration in original) (quoting Ruth Jones,
Assessment and Legal Education: What Is Assessment, and What the *# Does It Have to Do
with the Challenges Facing Legal Education?, 45 MCGEORGE L. REV. 85, 103 (2014)).
91. Id. at 69 (quoting Janet W. Fisher, Putting Students at the Center ofLegal Education:
How An Emphasis on Outcome Measures in the A.B.A. Standards for Approved Law Schools
Might Transform the Educational Experience of Law Students, 35 S. ILL. U. L.J. 225, 237
(2010)).
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The introduction of the Revised Standards has also raised ques-
tions. For instance, what knowledge or skills amount to "compe-
tency," and how should competency be measured?92 Also, what
types of student assessment are sufficient to satisfy the Revised
Standards, and how should law schools address the inevitable sub-
jectivity problems associated with student evaluation?93 In order to
address these and other issues, scholars have begun to set forth
principles to guide law schools in their implementation of the new
standards.94 According to Charles Cercone and Adam Lamparello,
the required learning outcomes, and the assessment hereof,
"should be developed through a collaborative and faculty-driven
process, and each outcome should be focused on training students
to develop the practical skills necessary to effectively practice
law."
95
Despite the general buy-in of most law faculties, the ABA's Re-
vised Standards, like the learning accommodations requirements
under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, are closer to regulations
than contracts. The implementation of the Revised Standards is
required by the ABA in order for law schools to attain or maintain
accreditation. The Revised Standards themselves therefore cannot
be considered an offer, which is "the manifestation of willingness to
enter into a bargain."96 Law schools also cannot be said to have
"accepted" the terms of the Revised Standards, because to reject
them would mean losing accreditation, resulting in the near-certain
collapse of the institution. It might be argued that there is consid-
eration in that the ABA promises accreditation while the law school
promises to follow the Revised Standards. However, because both
offer and acceptance are lacking, there is no mutual intent, and
therefore no contract. Instead, the Revised Standards are regula-
tory requirements handed down by the ABA as the regulating body.
Again, even to the extent that any contract is formed with respect
92. Abigail Loftus DeBlasis, Building Legal Competencies: The Montessori Method As a
Unifying Approach to Outcomes-Based Assessment in Law Schools, 42 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1,
21 (2015).
93. Cercone & Lamparello, supra note 83, at 45.
94. See, e.g., id. at 48-49 (laying out the following six steps: "(1) developing program-wide
learning outcomes; (2) developing outcome-specific skills; (3) incorporating outcome-specific
skills into all syllabi and grading rubrics to enable course-specific assessment; (4) mapping
outcome-specific skills throughout the entire curriculum on a course and program-specific
(departmental) basis, and program-wide basis; (5) measuring student attainment of a law
school's learning outcomes; and (6) using this information to comprehensively assess the cur-
riculum on a program-wide, program-specific, and course-specific basis, make changes where
appropriate"); Valentine, supra note 82, at 529-38 (laying out "Seven Principles to Guide
Transformation").
95. Cercone & Lamparello, supra note 83, at 50.
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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to the Revised Standards, such a contract would be a contract of
adhesion, "presented on a take it or leave it basis to the weaker
party who has no real opportunity to bargain about its terms,
'97
strongly indicating that "the contract is procedurally unconsciona-
ble because it suggests an absence of meaningful choice."98
Analyzed under contract theory, the ABA's Revised Standards-
like the various learning accommodations required by the federal
government-do not fit either the promise or consent theories. The
Revised Standards are handed down from above, in this case by the
ABA-the governing body of the legal profession-which has the
power to accredit (and de-accredit) all American law schools. There
is no promise in this arrangement, and no genuine consent. There
is an element of efficiency in that the Revised Standards are pre-
sented by the ABA and accepted by the law schools as "a vehicle for
maximizing individual and social gains."99 But in all, the ABA's
learning outcomes requirements are not contractual, but rather
mere regulatory measures.
3. Learning Outcomes
The legal academy has also lately recognized the advantages of
active learning over more traditional lecture and Socratic method
pedagogies. As one scholar points out, "[flegal educators have been
reminded and remonstrated repeatedly that by divorcing practice
from theory in our teaching, we are failing to educate our students
adequately."100 Many have noted that providing students with op-
portunities to simulate legal practice, including through clinical
practice, enhances students' judgment as well as their analytical,
reasoning, and problem-solving skills.10 1 Active learning has also
been shown to increase content retention, develop problem-solving
skills, and increase motivation.10 2 In the law school context, Alyson
Drake argues that active learning methods provide an effective
change-of-pace from traditional lectures and encourage students to
97. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 274 (2018).
98. Id.
99. Zemach & Ben-Zvi, supra note 39, at 201.
100. David B. Oppenheimer, Using A Simulated Case File to Teach Civil Procedure: The
Ninety-Percent Solution, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 817, 819 (2016) (citing, inter alia, The MacCrate
report, the Carnegie report, Best Practices for Legal Education, and Transforming the Edu-
cation of Lawyers).
101. Id. at 820; see also Christine P. Bartholomew, Twiqbal in Context, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC.
744, 762 (2016) ("At this point in legal education, the gains of active learning methods are
well-established. Active learning methods, as opposed to passive learning, 'require students
to engage in higher-order thinking such as analysis, synthesis, and evaluation."') (footnotes
omitted).
102. Bartholomew, supra note 101.
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work harder because, in an active learning setting, the professor
monitors each student's progress much more closely.
103
The ABA, apparently agreeing with such analyses, recently re-
vised its Accreditation Standards to require certain aspects of ac-
tive learning in the externship context:
A field placement course [must include] the following: . . . (iii)
a written understanding among the student, faculty member,
and a person in authority at the field placement hat describes
both (A) the substantial lawyering experience and opportuni-
ties for performance, feedback and self- evaluation; and (B) the
respective roles of faculty and any site supervisor in supervis-
ing the student and in assuring the educational quality of the
experience for the student, including a clearly articulated
method of evaluating the student's academic performance...
104
The ABA thus now demands a written agreement among the stu-
dent, the professor, and the supervisor at the placement, laying out
the terms of the externship, including active learning require-
ments,10 5 designed to allow students "to begin forming their profes-
sional identities.10 6
The new active learning mandate is a further regulatory require-
ment set out by the ABA for all accredited American law schools.
Therefore, like the ABA's Revised Standards, the active learning
requirements are the result of neither an offer on the part of the
ABA nor an acceptance on the part of the law schools. Arguably,
there is consideration in the ABA's promise of accreditation and the
law school's promise to follow the active learning requirements.
But, again, there is no mutual intent, and therefore no contract,
because both offer and acceptance are lacking. Thus, the active
learning requirements, like the ABA's Revised Standards, are
103. Alyson M. Drake, The Need for Experiential Legal Research Education, 108 LAW
LIBR. J. 511, 521 (2016).
104. STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, PROGRAM OF
LEGAL EDUCATION § 304(c) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016-17).
105. Id.
106. Drake, supra note 103, at 521-22 ("This overarching goal [the development of prac-
tice-ready skills], then, encompasses many smaller goals, including 'engaging students, un-
derstanding unequal social structures, advancing social justice, developing lawyering skills,
cultivating professional identity, fostering professional ethics, providing culturally compe-
tent client representation to a diverse array of clients, developing sound judgment and prob-
lem-solving abilities, gaining insight into law and the legal system, promoting lifelong learn-
ing, and learning to work collaboratively."') (quoting Deborah Maranville et al., Re-vision
Quest: A Law School Guide to Designing Experiential Courses Involving Real Lawyering, 56
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 517, 527 (2011-2012)).
Duquesne Law Review
closer to regulations handed down from above than to contracts.
Further, even were a contract to be formed, it would be a contract
of adhesion, likely unconscionable because it "suggests an absence
of meaningful choice.10 7
Under contract theory, the active learning requirements also do
not fit either the promise or consent theories due to the lack of
meaningful promise or consent. Perhaps there is an element of eco-
nomic efficiency in the law schools' agreement o abide by the active
learning requirements, but in the end these requirements are
handed down by the ABA and are therefore closer to regulations
than to any contractual agreement between the ABA and the law
schools it oversees.
B. Agreements Between Law Schools and Professors
The principal agreements between law schools and their profes-
sors concern employment. Traditionally, employment has been re-
garded as a contract108-the sale of one's labor in return for a salary,
"negotiated in much the same way as any other contract, and de-
pending entirely on the terms to which the parties agree."10 9 How-
ever, according to recent scholars, labor law before the industrial
age instead treated the relationship between employer and em-
ployee (accurately, in this author's opinion) as a master-servant re-
lationship, whereby the servant owed his master work in return for
economic support. 110
By contrast, contract law arose in the very different realm of com-
mercial dealings, mostly between merchants and between sellers
and purchasers of real property-scenarios that differ sharply from
107. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 274 (2018).
108. Rachel Arnow-Richman, The Role of Contract in the Modern Employment Relation-
ship, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 1, 1 (2003) (citing Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union Rep-
resentation Elections, and the First Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356, 406
(1995)).
109. Franklin G. Snyder, The Pernicious Effect of Employment Relationships on the Law
of Contracts, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 33, 36 (2003); see also Jeffrey D. Jones, The Public's
Interest in 'Private" Employment Relations, 16 LEWIS & CLARKL. REV. 657, 661 (2012) ("The
moral intuitions and norms that inform contract law are, in the first instance, imported into
employment law and made its foundation.").
110. Snyder, supra note 109, at 37-38. This includes the traditional notion of at-will em-
ployment, whose support continues to this day and which, according to one scholar, "draws
its strength from the deeply rooted conception of the employment relation as a dominant-
servient relation rather than one of mutual rights and obligations. The employer, as owner
of the enterprise, is viewed as owning the job with a property right to control the job and the
worker who fills it. That property right gives the employer the right to impose any require-
ment on the employee, give any order and insist on obedience, change any term of employ-
ment, and discard the employee at any time. The employer is sovereign over his or her em-
ployee subjects." Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine
Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 78 (2000).
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early master-servant-based employment law in that participation
in such commercial dealings is almost entirely voluntary and the
participants are, for the most part, equals.1 1 1
Employment law and contract law came together in the years fol-
lowing the American Revolution, which led to a general belief that
(at least with respect to free white male citizens) "employment is
simply a contract between parties .... In the eye of the law, [em-
ployer and employee] are both freemen-citizens having equal
rights, and brethren having one common destiny.' 112 However, as
scholars have noted, the legal philosophy of employment as contract
has never quite matched reality,113 and the continuing relevance of
status, as opposed to contract, in employment law is reflected by the
passage of numerous public labor laws and regulations1 14 through-
out the 20th Century reflecting little, if any, regard for the desires
of specific employers or employees.115 In fact, employment today "is
regulated by law in a host of ways entirely unrelated to the agree-
ment of the parties, dependent solely upon the relative status of
parties as employer and employee.
'116
Today, the default understanding of the employment relationship
is that it is at-will, whereby either employer or employee may end
the relationship whenever it is in their interests-outside of prohi-
bitions on wrongful termination due to discrimination or retalia-
tion.117 However, as some have noted, "the at-will rule has become
111. Snyder, supra note 109, at 39.
112. Id. at 43 (quoting OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE STATE
CONVENTION, ASSEMBLED MAY 4TH, 1853, at 550 (Boston 1853) (address delivered by Henry
Williams)).
113. See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, supra note 108, at 2-3 (noting that contract law requires
mutual assent and consideration, while workplace agreements often lack such formalities,
leading to a situation where the substance of the commitment "may be vague and indefinite,
particularly if it is made orally").
114. E.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-956, 84
Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2012)); Employment Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2012)).
115. Snyder, supra note 109, at 45-46.
116. Id. at 34; see also Jones, supra note 109, at 662 (arguing for a public interest in pri-
vate employment relations that subordinates contract and property law to "a larger redis-
tributive employment ideal").
117. See David Anthony Rutter, Title Vl1 Retaliation, A Unique Breed, 36 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 925, 925 (2003) ("The source of protection for employees in the private sector comes from
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). Title VII prohibits employers from dis-
criminating against employees because of their race, color, religion, sex or national origin. A
lesser known, although equally important section of Title VII, intended to serve as a guardian
over the anti-discrimination section of Title VII, is the anti-retaliation section of Title VII.").
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a much stickier default in many jurisdictions, rolling like a steam-
roller over evidence of contrary intent."118 Beyond the at-will pre-
sumption, some scholars argue that, rather than any formal em-
ployment contract (which is generally absent), the norms of each
workplace combine to form "a relational contract, which is more im-
portant to the parties in most situations than any formal written
agreement."119
In the law school context, there are a number of different types of
employment agreements between professors and the law school,
usually based on the particular professor's status. As Debra Moss
Curtis explains it, "Generally a law school faculty includes a vari-
ety of categories of teachers, including full-time faculty and adjunct
faculty, tenured professors and those hoping to someday get tenure,
and faculty with short term contracts, long term contracts, or
no contracts."120  Of these distinctions, the most significant, per-
haps, is between those professors with tenure (or the possibility of
tenure) and those without.
Generally speaking, non-tenured and non-tenure-track law pro-
fessors fall into three camps: adjuncts, legal research and writing
("LRW") professors, and clinicians. The employment of adjunct pro-
fessors aligns closely with typical at-will employment.12 1 Contrac-
tually speaking, LRW professors fall somewhere between adjuncts
and tenured and tenure-track faculty, being typically hired on re-
newable short-term contracts.122 For clinicians, the employment
landscape is more varied. Clinics employ "many different staffing
118. Matthew T. Bodie, The Best Way Out Is Always Through: Changing the Employment
at-Will Default Rule to Protect Personal Autonomy, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 223, 225 (2017) (citing
Deborah A. DeMott, Investing in Work: Wilkes as an Employment Law Case, 33 W. NEW ENG.
L. REV. 497, 509 (2011)).
119. Robert C. Bird, Employment as a Relational Contract, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 149,
150 (2005).
120. Debra Moss Curtis, Everything I Wanted to Know About Teaching Law School I
Learned from Being a Kindergarten Teacher: Ethics in the Law School Classroom, 2006 BYU
EDUC. & L.J. 455, 457 (2006).
121. See James Wong, Become an Adjunct, 28 NO. 5 ACC DOCKET 14, 14 (2010) ("[A]n ad-
junct ... is an independent contract worker in academia. The contract can be for the period
of a term, a year or longer. The position can be full-time, but is usually part-time. Normally,
but not always, a payment is made either through the university's payroll system-or less
often as 1099 MISC nonemployee income.").
122. Katerina P. Lewinbuk, Hard to Build, but Easy to Destroy?: Will Chaos in Legal Ed-
ucation Lead to Restructuring of Law Schools and Elimination of Faculty Tenure?, 39 J.
LEGAL PROF. 1, 15 (2014); see also Emily Grant, Toward A Deeper Understanding of Legal
Research and Writing as a Developing Profession, 27 VT. L. REV. 371, 379 (2003) ("The pre-
dominant model for hiring full-time LRW instructors involves renewable contracts."); Cath-
erine J. Wasson & Barbara J. Tyler, How Metacognitive Deficiencies of Law Students Lead to
Biased Ratings of Law Professors, 28 TOURO L. REV. 1305, 1320 (2012) ("The overwhelming
majority of legal writing professors, regardless of their length of experience, work on short-
term contracts, with little if any security of position.").
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arrangements, including traditional tenured or tenure-track pro-
fessors, clinic tenured or clinic tenure-track professors, contract-
term professors, visitors, adjuncts, and staff attorneys, who may be
on contracts or funded by grants. Many clinics use a combination
of these employment arrangements."
' 123
By far the most significant and well-known employment arrange-
ment in the law school setting is the tenure track, and its ultimate
result-tenure itself. Academic tenure, "accurately and unequivo-
cally defined, lays no claim whatever to a guarantee of lifetime em-
ployment. Rather, tenure provides only that no person continu-
ously retained as a full-time faculty member beyond a specified
lengthy period of probationary service may thereafter be dismissed
without adequate cause."124 Even under this limited definition, ten-
ure significantly "changes the employment-at-will relationship, in
which an employee can be terminated for any reason ..... 125 In
this sense, tenure is "a type of option-where the school is bound to
employ the tenured professor if she decides to come back year after
year unless there is adequate cause for termination, but where the
professor is free to leave after any year without any binding obliga-
tion to the school.'126 In any event, the exact parameters of tenure
are set out by the rules and regulations of each individual institu-
tion.1
27
123. Susan P. Liemer, The Hierarchy of Law School Faculty Meetings: Who Votes?, 73
UMKC L. REV. 351, 359 (2004).
124. John M. Badagliacca, The Decline of Tenure: The Sixth Circuit's Interpretation of Ac-
ademic Tenure's Substantive Protections, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 905, 905 (2014) (quoting
William Van Alstyne, Tenure: A Summary, Explanation, and "Defense", 57 AAUP BULL. 328,
328 (1971)).
125. Lewinbuk, supra note 122, at 13-14 (quoting Mark L. Adams, The Quest for Tenure:
Job Security and Academic Freedom, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 67, 74 (2006)); but see Badagliacca,
supra note 124, at 906 (noting that the court in Branham v. Thomas M. Cooley Law School,
689 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2012) found tenure to be no more than a vehicle for academic freedom,
"while providing no legal authority for continuous employment outside of their employment
contracts" (emphasis added)). This holding "set a precedent against the legal significance of
tenure status and bolstered the importance of employment contracts for graduate profes-
sors." Badagliacca, supra note 124, at 916.
126. Badagliacca, supra note 124, at 928. The protections provided by tenure, however,
change based on whether the law school is a public or private institution. See, e.g., Mark
Strasser, Tenure, Financial Exigency, and the Future of American Law Schools, 59 WAYNE
L. REV. 269, 271 (2013) ("Tenure creates a property interest protected under the United
States Constitution if the tenure grantor is a state entity. Because state action is required
to trigger the relevant constitutional guarantees, the Constitution as a general matter does
not afford protection to tenure violations at a private institution. Instead, those rights will
be protected as a matter of contract ....").
127. See Strasser, supra note 126, at 309 n. 15 (quoting Steven G. Olswang et al., Retrench-
ment, 30 J.C. & U.L. 47, 48-49 (2003) ("The fundamental source of authority, and the first
place to look, is the institution's own rules and regulations. An institution's policies frame
the relationships among the faculty, staff, students, and institution .... Some or all such
Duquesne Law Review
Being so varied, law professor employment agreements naturally
fall into different categories, supported by different contractual and
legal bases. However, standard adjunct contracts, renewable short-
term contracts typical of LRW professors and clinicians, and most
tenure-track positions are all typical at-will employment agree-
ments. Such agreements include an offer of employment by the law
school and acceptance of that offer by the professor. Consideration
consists of the professor's promise to teach the assigned course in
exchange for the law school's promise to pay a salary. There is also
plainly mutual intent to enter into the agreement.
Where such agreements fail to amount to genuine democratic
contracts lies precisely in their at-will nature. In the United States,
"[e]mployment is presumed to be at will unless an express or im-
plied contract states otherwise and such presumption is strong."128
At-will employment "is presumptively terminable at any time, with
or without cause, by either party. '129 As a result, an at-will em-
ployee "simply has no legally protected interest in his or her em-
ployment.' 130 Such flimsy agreements-resulting in no legally pro-
tected interest-cannot properly be considered contracts.
The employment contracts of tenured professors satisfy the same
elements as those of their untenured colleagues-there is an offer
of employment and an acceptance of that offer, consideration in the
form of teaching classes and salary paid, and mutual intent to enter
into the agreement. Where tenure differs is precisely in the em-
ployment guarantees made by the law school to the tenured profes-
sor, which significantly alter the presumptively at-will employment
agreement. Such an alteration is perfectly legitimate. "The em-
ployment-at-will doctrine is a rule of contract construction, not a
rule imposing substantive limitations on the parties' freedom to
contract; . . . 'if the parties include a clear job security provision in
an employment contract, the presumption that the employment is
at-will may be negated."'
131
However, the fact that tenured employment is not strictly speak-
ing "at-will" does not make this employment agreement a genuine
contract. Instead, as should be perfectly clear, tenure protects only
one party to the agreement-the professor. In fact, "[a]n employee
is never presumed to engage his services permanently .... indeed,
policies constitute, or at least supplement, the contract between the institution and its fac-
ulty.... Tenure can mean whatever the parties-limited by the relevant institutional policies
and statutes-define it to mean.").
128. 27 AM. JUR. 2D Employment Relationship § 9 (2018).
129. 82 AM. JUR. 2D Wrongful Discharge § 2 (2018).
130. 27 AM. JUR. 2D Employment Relationship § 9 (2018).
131. 19 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 54:39 (4th ed. 2018) (footnotes omitted).
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in this land of opportunity it would be against public policy and the
spirit of our institutions that any man should thus handicap him-
self; and the law will presume ... that he did not so intend."132 Fur-
ther, significantly, "if the contract of employment be not binding on
the employee for the whole term of such employment, then it cannot
be binding upon the employer; there would be lack of 'mutuality."'
' 133
Therefore, even tenured employment agreements would not appear
to be genuine democratically negotiated contracts.
In terms of Contract theory, adjunct contracts, as purely at-will
agreements on both sides, include few, if any, promises-the pro-
fessor may leave or be fired at any time. Neither is consent the
basis of these contracts, because the at-will nature of the contract
does not involve the transfer of any rights between the parties. In
effect, the at-will employment contract is an agreement based on
efficiency alone: as long as it is economically sensible for the law
school to employ the adjunct, and for the adjunct to perform the
requisite tasks for the offered pay, employment will continue.
When such efficiency is lacking for either party, employment ends
and the contract is void.
The renewable short-term contracts under which most LRW pro-
fessors and many clinicians work involve something closer to prom-
ise, in that even the shortest such contracts lay out a period of em-
ployment during which time the professor is promised a job (absent
firing for cause). However, this promise also goes in only one direc-
tion, because as a general matter the professor is free to leave at
any time, without penalty. For the same reason, such contracts are
not contracts of consent (as understood in contract theory) because
there is no "transfer of rights" from the professor to the law school;
the professor retains his or her rights in their entirety. Arguably,
such contracts do reflect a basis in economic efficiency, because law
schools are undoubtedly offering as much as needed (and no more)
to attract qualified candidates for professor positions, while eager
professors will accept what they require in compensation (and no
less) to perform the requisite duties. In this way, such agreements
may indeed be vehicles "for maximizing individual and social
gains."
134
132. Id. (quoting Seals v. Calcasieu Parish Voluntary Council on Aging, Inc., 758 So. 2d
286, 289 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2000), writ denied, 761 So. 2d 1292 (La. 2000)).
133. Id. (quoting Seals, 758 So. 2d at 289); see also id. ("[S]uch contracts frequently are,
in practical effect, unilateral undertakings by the employer to provide a job for so long as the
employee wishes to continue in it but impose no corresponding obligation upon the employee.
When this is the case, the burden of performance is unequal, as the employer appears to be
bound to the terms of the contract, while the employee is free to terminate it at will.").
134. Zemach & Ben-Zvi, supra note 39, at 201.
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Tenure-track positions also bear little relationship to promise,
outside of the specified term of the law school's offer letter-a prom-
ise that in any event flows in only one direction, because the profes-
sor may leave at any time. With respect to tenure, the law school
promises only to consider the faculty member's application for ten-
ure when the time comes-being free, of course, to deny it-while
the professor promises nothing, and may leave the law school at any
time for any reason, or for no reason at all. There is also no consent
manifested by either the law school or the tenure-track professor,
because no entitlements are being transferred from either party to
the other and neither is legally bound to do anything more than
maintain the at-will employment relationship until one party or the
other chooses to sever it. This sort of contract too can only be un-
derstood as a form of economic efficiency, in which the agreement
"facilitate[s] the efforts of [the] parties to maximize the joint gains
... from transactions.
' 135
Only with the granting and acceptance of tenure, then, do we see
anything different in the employment relationship between law
schools and law professors. With the tenure offer, the law school
promises something significant-the security of employment that
may be maintained indefinitely, absent only adequate cause for dis-
missal. However, the tenured law professor still manages to prom-
ise little or nothing, as he or she may always leave, for any reason.
There is also little "consent" in the tenure context, because the pro-
fessor who accepts tenure may still resign his or her post at any
time, and does not thereby transfer any significant rights or enti-
tlements to the law school. Finally, like all the professor contracts
here discussed (and perhaps all employment contracts), there is an
efficiency aspect to the granting and acceptance of tenure. Both
parties to the tenure agreement surely accept the terms out of a
desire to maximize individual and social gains-the law school by
maintaining an experienced, committed faculty, and the professor
by the tangible security and intellectual and emotional support that
tenure provides.
C. Agreements Between Law Schools and Students
Numerous agreements are formed every year between law
schools and their students. In this section we will consider the most
important of them, including academic oaths, law school honor
codes, and student handbooks.
135. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 54, at 544.
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1. Academic Oaths
Many law schools require their incoming students to take a pro-
fessionalism oath at the start of 1L year.136 The number of schools
administering such oaths to entering law students appears to be on
the rise, with many of these oaths being administered recently for
the first time.13 7 The reason cited by some law school deans for such
oaths is to create a way for incoming students to understand the
responsibilities of entering a profession, with the inspiration of
medical schools' "white-coat" ceremonies often cited.
138
The content of these professionalism oaths naturally varies, but
there are a number of notable through-lines. Many start with an
acknowledgment of the privileges, duties, and responsibilities of be-
coming a lawyer.1 9 They demand that students conduct them-
selves with dignity,140 integrity,141 civility, 142 courtesy,143 and re-
spect.144 A number of the oaths require action without prejudice
and with respect for the rights and dignity of others.145 Many of
these oaths also lay out the responsibilities and high ideals inherent
136. See, e.g., Professionalism Oaths for Incoming Classes, WASHBURN U. SCH. L.,
http://washburnlaw.edu/students/honorcode/oaths.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) [herein-
after WASHBURN]; School of Law: Oath of Professionalism, U. DAYTON, http://www.uday-
ton.edu/law/students/professionalism-oath.php (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) [hereinafter
DAYTON].
137. See, e.g., Sandwell-Weiss, Class of 2015 Takes Professionalism Oath, U. ARIZ. (Aug.
21, 2012), https://law.arizona.edu/news/2012/08/class-2015-takes-professionalism-oath (first
professionalism oath administered August 17, 2012) [hereinafter ARIZONA]; WASHBURN, su-
pra note 136 (professionalism oath finalized and administered beginning fall 2014).
138. See, e.g., ARIZONA, supra note 137.
139. See, e.g., Atlanta's John Marshall Law School Orientation on Professionalism, JOHN
MARSHALL L. SCH. (Aug. 16, 2014), http://www.johnmarshall.edu/wp-content/uploads/Convo-
cation-Materials.pdf [hereinafter JOHN MARSHALL]; DAYTON, supra note 136; Incoming Law
Students Take Oath of Professionalism, U. SAN DIEGO (Aug. 17, 2016), http://www.sandi-
ego.edu/news/detail.php?-focus=56021 [hereinafter SAN DIEGO]; Student Professionalism
Oath, U. S.C. SCH. L., http://sc.edu/study/colleges-schools/law/internal/current-students/_
documents/student-oath.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) [hereinafter SOUTH CAROLINA].
140. DAYTON, supra note 136; JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 139; SOUTH CAROLINA, supra
note 139; SAN DIEGO, supra note 139.
141. JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 139; Law Students'Pledge, U. HAW. MANOA WILLIAM S.
RICHARDSON SCH. L., http://www.law.hawaii.edu/students/law-students-pledge (last visited
Sept. 10, 2018) [hereinafter HAWAII]; SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 139; SAN DIEGO, supra
note 139.
142. DAYTON, supra note 136; JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 139; HAWAII, supra note 141;
SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 139.
143. JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 139; SAN DIEGO, supra note 139; WASHBURN, supra note
136.
144. DAYTON, supra note 136; SAN DIEGO, supra note 139; WASHBURN, supra note 136
(adding the significant pledge that students will also treat themselves with respect).
145. JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 139; SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 139; HAWAII, supra
note 141 (pledging "[t]o advance the interests of those I serve before my own, . . . [t]o guard
zealously legal, civil and human rights which are the birthright of all people, [a]nd above all,
[t]o endeavor always to seek justice").
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in the learned profession of the law,146 noting that students' actions
reflect not only upon themselves, but also upon the university and
the legal profession.1 4 7 The oaths also ask students to pledge dili-
gent performance of their duties and responsibilities in law school,
including being prepared for class, studying hard, and upholding
standards of academic integrity and ethics.1 48 The vows are "sol-
emnl,"149 and often end with the phrase, "This pledge I take freely
and upon my honor.
150
It may not seem like much these days to take a pledge upon my
honor, but such oaths tend to have a stronger impact than one
might expect. The psychology of an oath, especially the physical act
itself "may heighten an otherwise nebulous concept into a moral ob-
ligation."151 This is particularly true at the start of law school,
where students are acutely aware of entering a new profession, with
new rules and responsibilities.152 According to Carol Rice Andrews,
"Even the simple oath can prompt ethical reflection, as the actual
act of taking the oath is a moment of high ethical aspiration.
'153
However, not all observers are quite so sanguine about these in-
creasingly popular oaths. For instance, Robert Steinbuch writes
that he views "with significant skepticism the growing movement
at law schools wherein brand new students are asked to swear to
professionalism oaths."15 4 Steinbach notes that the entering stu-
dents rarely, if ever, have any say in the drafting of the oaths and
are asked to swear to them without any consideration in return.
155
Further, because the oaths set out largely undefined obligations
146. DAYTON, supra note 136; JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 139.
147. DAYTON, supra note 136; WASHBURN, supra note 136; SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note
139; SAN DIEGO, supra note 139.
148. JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 139; WASHBURN, supra note 136; SOUTH CAROLINA, su-
pra note 139; SAN DIEGO, supra note 139; HAWAII, supra note 141.
149. WASHBURN, supra note 136; SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 139.
150. DAYTON, supra note 136; JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 139; SAN DIEGO, supra note
139.
151. Heidi K. Brown, Converting Benchslaps to Backslaps Instilling Professional Account-
ability in New Legal Writers by Teaching and Reinforcing Context, 11 LEGAL COMM. &
RHETORIC 109, 146 (2014).
152. See id. (citing TIMOTHY MAZUR, COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS & THE CORPORATE
SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 12:28 (2013) (discussing the act of signing an honor code or hon-
esty pledge and suggesting how "delivering a message promoting compliance immediately
prior to a moment of risk can have a powerful, positive impact on behavior")); Lipshaw, supra
note 47, at 334 (discussing precontractual negotiations, and suggesting that a "ritual act, like
signing, dripping wax, or stitching with special string, changes its legal character").
153. Brown, supra note 151 (quoting Carol Rice Andrews, The Lawyer's Oath: Both An-
cient and Modern, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 3, 55 (2009)).
154. Robert Steinbuch, The Problem with Forcing Law Students to Take Professionalism
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such as "professionalism," the students do not know what they are
promising and the schools do not know what their students have
promised, leading to possible under- or over-enforcement issues.156
Steinbuch also notes that any such oath obligations should involve
a discussion between the parties regarding the meaning of taking
an oath and the opportunity to decline to do so, both of which appear
to be lacking at most schools.
157
Analyzed in terms of standard contract formation, there is nei-
ther offer nor acceptance in the professionalism oath. There is no
consideration. And there is no mutual intent, because the students
have no choice but to take the oath if they want to continue as stu-
dents. Further, these oaths are handed down from above, and any
"contract" formed would be a contract of adhesion, likely uncon-
scionable because it "suggests an absence of meaningful choice."
158
In the language of contract theory, an academic oath is not con-
tract as promise, because the incoming students are not permitted
to dispose of their individual rights as they choose; such an oath is
not, in the words of Charles Fried, "the willing invocation by a free
moral agent of a convention that allows him to bind his will.
'159
These oaths are also not contract as consent, because there is no
effective voluntary consent on the part of the students, and there-
fore no legally enforceable obligation.160 The oaths come closest to
the contract as economic efficiency, in that such an oath, at the very
beginning of law school, may be a source of "welfare maximiza-
tion"161 because the law school receives a solemn promise from every
incoming student that he or she will behave according to the norms
and standards of the school; however, the welfare maximized in
such cases surely leans in the direction of the law school, which
drafts, demands, and receives a promise to abide by its own terms.
2. Honor Codes
Another source of agreements between law schools and students
may be found in the honor codes that most law schools require their
students to follow. In general, these codes "are intended to express
ethical standards and do not serve merely as a list of rules and sanc-
tions," focusing instead on values such as honesty, integrity, and
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 274 (2018).
159. Fried, supra note 42, at 972-73.
160. See Barnett, supra note 39, at 300.
161. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 54, at 544.
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fairness.16 2 Part of the intention behind honor codes is to signal to
the law student, at the earliest stage of his or her career, that the
profession they are about to enter requires certain standards of ac-
tion "necessary to preserve the spirit of the law and the profes-
sion."163 As such, law students "should be required to follow an
honor code 'which is representative of the ethical standards of the
legal profession.'1 6 4 The hope, of course, is that by learning the
professional standards expected of them, and by following these
standards, law students will continue to observe professional ethics
once in practice.16 5 Some scholars emphasize that such an introduc-
tion to the ethical standards and professionalism required in legal
practice must begin in law schools, which have "not just the oppor-
tunity, but arguably the responsibility, to develop attitudes and dis-
positions consistent with professionalism."
166
The normative goals for law school honor codes are quite broad.
Scholars argue that such codes should provide, first of all, "a clear
regulatory regime for safeguarding the integrity of the basic aca-
demic functions of teaching and evaluation."16 7 Such a regime
should consist of a detailed set of rules designed to enhance equity
in the evaluation and review of student work and fairness in aca-
demic competition among students.168 In order to perform this role,
honor codes should provide clear descriptions of impermissible con-
duct, enforcement procedures, and sanctions to be imposed in the
event of code violations.16 9 Considering that attending law school
162. Kimberly C. Carlos, Comment, The Future of Law School Honor Codes: Guidelines
for Creating and Implementing Effective Honor Codes, 65 UMKC L. REV. 937, 940 (1997).
163. Nicola A. Boothe-Perry, Enforcement of Law Schools'Non-Academic Honor Codes: A
Necessary Step Towards Professionalism?, 89 NEB. L. REV. 634, 636 (2011).
164. Carlos, supra note 162, at 941 (quoting the student conduct code at the University of
Arkansas School of Law).
165. Id. at 941-42; see also id. at 942 ("The commitment to ethics and to the professional-
ism that the legal profession demands should begin at the very moment law students start
their legal education. This commitment to ethics in the legal profession is strengthened and
enhanced by honor codes. Honor codes can be seen to serve the same function as professional
ethics codes, thus creating a system of self-governance and self-regulation."); Boothe-
Perry, supra note 163, at 636 ("Awareness and conformance to rules and regulations govern-
ing the appropriate and acceptable scope of behavior for students pursuing law degrees will
provide practice and reinforcement for professional behavior in subsequent practice.").
166. Boothe-Perry, supra note 163, at 636; see also id. ("Throughout the tenure of a law-
yer's professional life, law schools are the singular institutions with the opportunity, the re-
sources, the institutional capacity, and the leverage to effectuate meaningful training in pro-
fessionalism. It is therefore critical that they should have the right to promulgate and ad-
minister reasonable rules and regulations to fulfill that responsibility.").
167. Steven K. Berenson, What Should Law School Student Conduct Codes Do?, 38 AKRON
L. REV. 803, 831 (2005).
168. Id. at 849.
169. Id.
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on its own appears to have "very little impact on the moral develop-
ment of law students,"170 honor codes are considered by some to play
a vital role in this aspect of legal training.171
Nonetheless, there are also issues with law school honor codes.
For some, this sort of moral training is too little, too late for what
ought to have been learned by the undergraduate level.172 For ex-
ample, by the time they reach law school, most students are pre-
sumably aware of and understand most of the conduct proscribed
by honor codes, such as plagiarism, improper collaboration, and
cheating.173 On the flip side, honor codes (like all codes) are regu-
larly accused of ambiguity, leaving students to complain that they
often cannot tell whether or not they have breached the terms of the
code.174 A more serious pedagogical issue may be that honor codes,
by emphasizing proscribed joint behavior, often discourage collabo-
rative learning.
175
Honor codes, like professionalism oaths, feature neither offer nor
acceptance. No consideration exists, because there is no bargained-
for performance or return promise on the part of the law school.
There is no mutual intent, and therefore no contract, because honor
codes are handed down from above, and would amount at most to a
likely unenforceable contract of adhesion.
Like academic oaths, honor codes do not fall under the contract
as promise model, because they do not allow students to promise
away their rights by choice, but rather demand student acceptance
of unnegotiated norms, with no reciprocal obligation on the part of
the law school. For the same reason, there is no voluntary consent
to the transfer of any otherwise held entitlements-in fact, consent
is required on the part of the students if they wish to remain en-
rolled. As with other one-sided agreements we have examined,
honor codes come closest to the efficiency model of contracts, in that
students agree to abide by the law school's honor code as a means
170. Id. at 820.
171. Id. at 824.
172. See, e.g., id. at 819-20 ("[W]e would expect students at the graduate level, as a result
of their greater age, educational, and life experiences, to have obtained a higher level of moral
reasoning than undergraduate students. For this reason, it may be that the aspirational and
educational aspects of a code of conduct are less important at the graduate level than at the
undergraduate level.").
173. Id. at 820.
174. Brigette LuAnn Willauer, Comment, The Law School Honor Code and Collaborative
Learning: Can They Coexist?, 73 UMKC L. REV. 513, 523-24 (2004) (quoting Barbara Kate
Repa, Do Honor Codes Work? Law Schools Wrestle with Crime and Punishment, MAKING THE
COMPETENT LAWYER: MODELS FOR LAW SCHOOL ACTION 33 (ABA Standing Committee on
Lawyer Competence ed., 1990)).
175. Willauer, supra note 174, at 536-37.
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of gaining from the transaction-in this case, gaining a law de-
gree-while law schools gain a student body that promises to play
by the school's rules.
3. Student Handbooks
Another source of agreements between law schools and their stu-
dents is the law school student handbook or student manual. Such
handbooks are prepared in order to provide information to students
about the law school,176 as well as establishing standards that the
law school expects students to meet.177 In the words of one scholar,
student handbooks "are a kind of road map identifying significant
informational mileposts and explaining how the institution oper-
ates.178 Whether the drafting of student handbooks and their as-
signment to students amounts to a contractual relationship be-
tween the student and the law school is the source of some confusion
and disagreement.
179
It is true that numerous cases of disciplinary process against stu-
dents based on provisions of the student handbook have been liti-
gated in U.S. courts.180 Such litigation has occurred when, for ex-
ample, factual situations not addressed in the handbook arise,
181
when procedures for addressing violations have not been fol-
lowed,18 2 when expectations are ill-defined or subject to different
interpretations,1 8 3 and especially when the law school attempts to
alter the student's current relationship with the institution.
18 4
As one scholar notes, "[c]ase law is replete with references to the
relationship between ... students and educational institutions as
176. Ralph D. Mawdsley, Litigation Involving Higher Education Employee and Student
Handbooks, 109 EDUC. L. REP. 1031, 1031 (1996).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., id. at 1049.
180. See, e.g., George L. Blum, Annotation, Claims of Student Plagiarism and Student
Claims Arising from Such Allegations, 83 A.L.R. 6th 195 (2013).
181. Mawdsley, supra note 176, at 1032.
182. Id. (citing Fellheimer v. Middlebury Coll., 869 F. Supp. 238, 246-47 (D. Vt. 1994)
(private college ordered to reinstate or grant new hearing to student found guilty of disre-
spect to persons, after having been found not guilty of rape, where student had been provided
notice of charge of rape, but not charge of disrespect to persons); Kalinsky v. State Univ. of
N.Y., 161 A.2d 1006 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (student denied enrollment after having been
found guilty of plagiarism entitled to new hearing where neither hearing committee nor dean
would reveal evidence on which they had based their decisions, a requirement in the student
handbook)).
183. Mawdsley, supra note 176, at 1032.
184. Id.
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contractual in nature."18 5 However, the question of whether a stu-
dent handbook is part of that contractual relationship depends, like
any contract, on the intent of the parties,186 and as a general matter,
"the concept of handbooks as part of a contract with commitments
and expectations on both sides does not necessarily seem to have
universal acceptance."1 8 7 This is especially true where, as is more
and more often the case, the student handbook explicitly states that
its terms do not form a contract between the student and the insti-
tution.18
8
Assuming, however, that the law school student handbook does
set out at least part of the terms of a contract between student and
law school, what kind of a contract is this? Student handbooks, like
professionalism oaths and honor codes, make no provisions for offer
or acceptance, meaning no mutual intent. There is also an absence
of consideration, in the form of the law school's performance or re-
turn promise to the student for his/her agreement to abide by the
handbook. Further, student handbooks are crafted by one party
only, with the other party handed nothing more than "an absence
of meaningful choice.18 9
Like the academic oaths and honor codes discussed above, stu-
dent handbooks-which are not negotiated, but amount to rules
handed down by the law school-lack the fundamental elements of
negotiation and exchange that underlie both the promise and con-
sent models of contract. Instead, to the extent that following the
rules in the student handbook permits law students to pursue their
chosen degree while authorizing law schools to regulate student be-
havior, the student handbook is closest to the efficiency model as,
arguably, "a vehicle for maximizing individual and social gains."190
185. Id. at 1033 (citing Peretti v. Montana, 464 F. Supp. 784, 786 (D. Mont. 1979) ("This
contract is conceived as one by which the student agrees to pay all required fees, maintain
the prescribed level of academic achievement, and observe the school's disciplinary regula-
tions, and in return for which the school agrees to allow the student to pursue his course of
studies and be granted a diploma upon the successful completion thereof.")); see also
Mawdsley, supra note 176, at 1033 ("[L]egal actions by students against higher education
institutions will generally be grounded in contract.").
186. Mawdsley, supra note 176, at 1034.
187. Id. at 1049.
188. See, e.g., Brooklyn Law School Student Handbook 2017-18, https://blsconnect.brook-
law.edu/administrative/policies/Pages/Student-Handbook.aspx ("Although you are expected
to follow the rules and policies in this Handbook, the Handbook does not form a contract of
any kind.").
189. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 274 (2018).
190. Zemach & Ben-Zvi, supra note 39, at 201.
Duquesne Law Review
D. Agreements Between Professors and Students
1. Syllabi
The most common form of contracting between Law Professors
and their students is familiar to everyone-the humble syllabus.
Syllabi typically set out "the order of march for the course, including
the course materials and the reading assignments for each day or
week, and any assignments that have to be handed in during the
semester," as well as the nature of evaluation and the means of cal-
culating grades.191 Syllabi requirements and other elements vary
from course to course and even from professor to professor teaching
the same class; such differences "are generally accepted as reflect-
ing the academic freedom and autonomy of the individual faculty
member.' 192 The most useful syllabi will address student and pro-
fessor roles and responsibilities, including expectations regarding
student preparation and participation, and professor feedback and
fairness.193 Syllabi also address expectations and policies associ-
ated with attendance, deadlines, and academic integrity. 194
The purpose of the syllabus is not only to enumerate and com-
municate necessary class details, but also to establish a tone for the
class195 and to "memorialize [course] design decisions" such as
goals, class materials, assignments, teaching and learning meth-
ods, and evaluation procedures.196 By plainly laying out such de-
tails, the syllabus allows both student and professor to refer back
to and rely upon them throughout the course.197
191. Paul Bateman, Toward Diversity in Teaching Methods in Law Schools: Five Sugges-
tions from the Back Row, 17 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 397, 422 (1997).
192. Terrence Leas, The Course Syllabus: Legal Status and Implications for Practitioners,
177 EDUC. L. REP. 771, 774 (2003).
193. Gerald F. Hess, Collaborative Course Design: Not My Course, Not Their Course, but
Our Course, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 367, 374 (2008).
194. Id.
195. See id. at 373-74 ("The syllabus is often the first contact students have with the
teacher-it leaves a lasting impression. A syllabus that is clear, organized, thoughtful, com-
prehensive, and engaging conveys to students a model of professional thinking and perfor-
mance. Conversely, a syllabus that is sloppy, disjointed, incomplete, and misleading com-
municates a lack of competence, respect, and professionalism.").
196. Id. at 373.
197. Id.; see also Brown, supra note 151, at 136 ("For some professors, it seems shocking,
and disrespectful, when students balk at following the rules and complain that professors
impose unrealistic deadlines and penalties for failure to follow submission requirements. To
curtail this type of attitude from the beginning of a professor-student relationship, syllabi
should be explicit in providing context of why such rules are in place, and what aspects of
professionalism they are intended to teach ....").
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While it may seem strange at first to consider a syllabus a con-
tract, scholars have been doing so for years.198 Nor is this neces-
sarily a negative depiction; as one scholar explains, "the sylla-
bus should serve as a contract between teacher and students, which
delineates their respective responsibilities and guides their behav-
ior during the course."199 Nonetheless, the increasingly detailed ob-
ligations and requirements laid out in more modern syllabi can
adopt some negative contractual elements such as the use of legal-
ese, and may result in demand-oriented contracts that tend to place
burdens on students.200 As one writer recently put it, "[T]he notion
of the syllabus as a contract has grown ever more literal, down to a
proliferation of fine print and demands by some professors that stu-
dents must sign and attest that they have read and understood.'" 20
1
In terms of the rules of contract formation, however, there is no
room for either offer or acceptance with respect to the syllabus.
Consideration is absent. Finally, there is no mutual intent, because
a student has no choice but to accept and abide by the syllabus if he
or she wishes to succeed in (or even pass) the class. Syllabi are by
their nature handed down from above, and any contract formed
would be a contract of adhesion, likely unconscionable.
Syllabi, which, as noted, are generally not subject to negotiation,
also fall outside of the promise and consent models of contract in
that there is no willing transfer of the student's rights. Instead,
acceptance of the requirements of the syllabus is closest to an eco-
nomically efficient trade-off in which the student agrees to follow
the syllabus requirements in exchange for the increased possibility
of a higher grade at the end of the semester.
2. Course Policies
In addition to traditional syllabi, many law professors are now
providing detailed course policies, spelling out and clarifying the
rules and agreements governing the professor's expectations of the
198. See, e.g., Bateman, supra note 191, at 422 ("[T]he reality is that we all have a student
learning contract in place by means of our course syllabi"); Kevin H. Smith, "X-File" Law
School Pedagogy: Keeping the Truth Out There, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 27, 40 (1998) ("The syl-
labus is, in essence, a contract between you and your students."); Jeff Todd, Student Rights
in Online Course Materials: Rethinking the Faculty/ University Dynamic, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 311, 333 (2007) ("[T]he syllabus is a contract").
199. Hess, supra note 193, at 374.
200. See Brian R. Gallini, From Philly to Fayetteville: Reflections on Teaching Criminal
Law in the First Year, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 475, 489 n.23 (2011) (citing Paula Wasley, The Syl-




students.20 2 Such course policies contain information regarding, for
example, assignments and submissions, attendance, conferences,
penalties, and grading.20 3 In addition to providing such details,
course policies can in themselves be an effective pedagogical device,
laying out the detailed requirements for any legal submission; as
one scholar explains, such requirements "mirror court rules for
written submissions, itemizing deadlines and clear standards for
substantive components, formatting, citation, font, margins, line
spacing, page numbering or word count, and electronic or hard-copy
transmission to the grader.
'20 4
One criticism of course policy documents is that the rules set out
may be so detailed and complex that they discourage careful study
by students or, worse, provide for overly harsh penalties and unre-
alistic expectations that students may have difficulty achieving.
205
Heidi Brown pushes back against such criticisms, noting that pro-
fessors generally put a great deal of time and care into drafting ef-
fective course policies, with their only goal being to provide a learn-
ing experience regarding the actual procedural practice of law.
20 6
Course policies, like syllabi, generally feature neither offer nor
acceptance. Consideration is lacking. Mutual intent to contract
does not exist, and there is therefore no contract, because course
policies are merely handed down from above, without the benefit of
negotiation,20 7 and amount at most to a likely unenforceable con-
tract of adhesion.
In terms of contract theory, course policies, like syllabi, do not fit
within the promise or consent models of contract. Rather, they
202. See, e.g., Maureen Arrigo-Ward, How to Please Most of the People Most of the Time:
Directing (or Teaching in) A First-Year Legal Writing Program, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 557, 575
(1995) ("All [California Western School of Law] students receive a detailed description
of course policies and procedures .... [These] policies are lengthy and the students are re-
quired to read them on their own ... ").
203. David D. Walter, Student Evaluations - A Tool for Advancing Law Teacher Profes-
sionalism and Respect for Students, 6 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 177, 227 n.69
(2000).
204. Brown, supra note 151, at 134.
205. See, e.g., Joe Patrice, A Law Professor's Detailed, Ridiculous, Condescending "Local
Rules" for Class, ABOVE L. (Feb. 7, 2014), http://abovethelaw.com/2014/02/a-law-professors-
detailed-ridiculous-condescending-local-rules-for-class/.
206. Brown, supra note 151, at 151 n.163.
207. See Leas, supra note 192, at 772-73 ("The department or the faculty member develops
the curriculum, and the faculty member develops a course syllabus incorporating that cur-
riculum and the rules governing the faculty member's course. In rare cases, a faculty member
will permit students to negotiate some of the elements of the course; generally, however, the
faculty member dictates the substantive elements of the course and consigns the student to
'take it or leave it."'). This sort of top-down structure is (at least at times) in contrast with
that of learning contracts; see infra Section II.D.3.
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amount to efficiency exchanges, in which students accept the pro-
fessor's demands in hopes of receiving an acceptable grade in re-
turn.
3. Learning Contracts
Another form of agreement between professor and student, albeit
a much less common one, is known as the learning contract. For
decades, professors have periodically attempted to work with their
students at the start of the semester to negotiate a contract for the
learning project on which they are preparing jointly to embark.208
Some of the issues on which negotiations have centered include as-
signments, pacing, deadlines, the method of teaching, and even the
content of the class.20 9 Although such negotiations would seem to
match up extremely well with the subject matter of the law school
curriculum, apparently very few law school professors have at-
tempted such an experiment.210
One of the main goals of the learning contract is "to encourage
individualized learning by tailoring the educational experience to
the objectives of individual students."211 Naturally, professors may
be reluctant to completely reorganize their classes on the basis of
student requests; however, especially in smaller classes and semi-
nars, professors are generally willing to consider the goals and de-
sires of their students in designing a course significant to all par-
ties.212 A positive side effect of such negotiations is that they pro-
vide the student and the professor with opportunities to learn about
each other's concerns; naturally the professor and the students may
have different goals, but different students may have different goals
as well. 213 Once such differences have been identified, negotiations
may begin in earnest.214
The goals of learning contracts include: allowing students to set
the proper pace for the course, providing students the opportunity
to work directly with professors in the negotiation process, and cre-
208. Jane H. Aiken et al., The Learning Contract in Legal Education, 44 MD. L. REV. 1047,
1047 (1985).
209. See generally id.
210. Bateman, supra note 191, at 421-22; but see id. at 422 ("In the last few years, how-
ever, interest in the use of the learning contract has increased as an option for providing
appropriate supervision in law school clinical programs as well as an option for including an
interactive component in student learning.").
211. Aiken et al., supra note 208, at 1048.
212. Id. at 1049.
213. Id. at 1048.
214. Id. at 1048-49.
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ating a less hierarchical structure between professor and stu-
dent.215 But perhaps the most important goal of the learning con-
tract is motivational, the theory being that students who are per-
mitted to play a role in designing the course will be more invested
in the learning process accompanying it.216 Indeed, studies have
indicated that students who negotiated and signed learning con-
tracts "developed a greater sense of personal responsibility for ac-
quiring and applying improved study skills" than other students.
217
Further, use of such contracts has led to a "level of commitment that
was significantly more pronounced . . . than among previous stu-
dents."
2 18
There are of course potential issues with the implementation of
learning contracts in the law school setting. For instance, some stu-
dents will always believe that it is the professor's job to design the
course, and may look upon required student involvement as under-
mining the integrity and seriousness of the class.219 Others may be
unnerved by early uncertainty regarding the structure of the course
or may balk at the use of class time for negotiations rather than
teaching content.220 Some have warned that it is the professor's
215. Id. at 1049; see also Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, Learning from Conflict: Reflections
on Teaching About Race and Gender, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 515, 517 (2003) ("By sharing power
and encouraging experimental learning formats, I was able to create a space that opened new
intellectual doors for me. Students and faculty renegotiated their relationships to each other,
and through that process we each began to understand our roles as life-long learners. Teach-
ing intellectually serious graduate students and learning from them became exciting, even
fun.").
216. Aiken et al., supra note 208, at 1049; see also Bateman, supra note 191, at 422 ("The
value of a student learning contract lies in three characteristics. First, since students become
more involved in their own learning and mastery of a subject, they are more motivated to
learn and therefore work harder. Second, because the contract is formed with the student's
input, at least part of the course design can take into account the student's own learning
preferences and the student can learn at an individualized pace. This, of course, presents
the problem of whether the student's own perceived pace is adequate enough for course cov-
erage. That problem, though, can be overcome through the negotiation of the contract. Third,
the student learning contract changes the balance of power between student and professor,
which some professors may see as an advantage, others as a distinct disadvantage.").
217. Aiken et al., supra note 208, at 1049 (quoting Goldman, Contract Teaching of Aca-
demic Skills, 25 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 320, 323 (1978)).
218. Aiken et al., supra note 208, at 1049 (quoting Barlow, An Experiment with Learning
Contracts, 45 J. HIGHER EDUC. 441, 446 (1974)); see also Aiken et al., supra note 208, at 1050
("Results of controlled experiments using learning contracts in various settings suggest that
contracting produces benefits [including] increased study time and improved test scores ...
The impressionistic articles in favor of learning contracts are equally positive .
219. Hess, supra note 193, at 377.
220. Id.
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duty to ensure that students maintain responsibility for course de-
sign only to the extent that they are able to exercise mature judg-
ment on such matters.22
1
Nonetheless, overall the literature is extremely positive regard-
ing the results and benefits of learning contracts.222 Perhaps this
is not surprising, in that learning contracts, unlike virtually every
agreement considered in this article-covering multiple permuta-
tions of contractual, semi-contractual, agreement-based, and ex-
change-related relationships in the law school context-is openly
and plainly negotiated between the parties. The learning contract
is the product of genuine offer and acceptance as a culmination of
negotiations, amounting to mutual intent to enter the agreement.
There is consideration in the form of the professor's promise and the
student's return promise to each abide by the negotiated terms.
223
Thus, the learning contract is a genuine, democratically negotiated
contract.
With respect to contract theory, learning contracts clearly fit
within the promise model, where the student and professor, as free
moral agents, promise certain actions in the course of their relation-
ship, forming not "a communication of intention ... [but] a commit-
ment to a future course of conduct."224 Likewise, the learning con-
tract follows the structure of the contract as consent, in that the
student and the professor bring certain rights to the table and then
"manifest their assent to the transfer of these rights."225 Learning
contracts also follow the economic efficiency model, because the de-
liberate negotiation and tradeoffs between professor and student
truly "facilitate the efforts of contracting parties to maximize the
joint gains . . . from transactions.'226 Indeed, of all the contracts,
semi-contracts, agreements, and exchanges governing relationships
in the law school context, only one-the learning contract-appears
to fit within all three theories of contract. Learning contracts are
221. MARYELLEN WEIMER, LEARNER-CENTERED TEACHING: FIVE KEY CHANGES TO
PRACTICE 43 (2002).
222. See, e.g., Aiken et al., supra note 208, at 1090 ("We ... know that our methodology,
part of which involves using learning contracts through which we divest ourselves of some of
our power, is well received by most of our students. It inspires many of them to realize that
they can make intelligent decisions about what and how to learn, in law school and thereaf-
ter. We have seen students balk at accepting responsibility, identify their fears, and over-
come them.").
223. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("To constitute
consideration ... a return promise must be bargained for .... [A] return promise is bargained
for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in
exchange for that promise.").
224. Michigan Law Review Association, supra note 40, at 905.
225. Barnett, supra note 39, at 319.
226. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 54, at 544.
Duquesne Law Review
thus discernibly the most fairly negotiated and democratic contrac-
tual relationships in the law school universe. As such, they are, at
the very least, deserving of further study.227
III. CONCLUSION
This article considers the various agreements, exchanges, con-
tracts of adhesion, and genuine contracts that underlie the func-
tioning of the law school as an organization. We have considered
and analyzed agreements between the federal government and the
ABA and the law schools they regulate, between law schools and
professors, between law schools and students, and finally between
professors and students.
Some of these agreements lack any negotiating power on the part
of one party-including learning accommodations under the ADA
and the ABA's learning outcome and active learning requirements.
Such agreements lack offer and acceptance and mutuality of intent,
as well as consideration, and therefore are, at best, contracts of ad-
hesion, likely unconscionable because they suggest "an absence of
meaningful choice."228 These agreements also reflect none of the
elements of contract under the promise, consent, or efficiency theo-
ries because they are not really contracts at all, but regulations
handed down from above.
Law professors' at-will employment agreements, while incorpo-
rating the required elements of contract formation-namely offer,
acceptance, consideration, and mutual intent-fail to amount to
genuine contracts due to their at-will nature. Because an at-will
employee "simply has no legally protected interest in his or her em-
ployment,"229 such agreements cannot be seen as contracts because
neither party must abide by them. Short-term and long-term con-
tracts, as well as tenure agreements, also feature the required con-
tract elements, but fail to amount to genuine contracts because they
protect only the professor (to varying extents), and not the law
school, thus demonstrating a distinct lack of mutuality.230 In terms
of contract theory, law professor employment agreements do reflect
the promise theory, but only in a single direction. That is, most law
professor contracts reflect an employment promise on the part of
the law school but no return promise on the part of the professor.
In addition, such agreements are generally not contracts of consent
227. The author of this article is currently at work on such a study, entitled: A Meeting of
the Minds: The Promise of the Learning Contract in Law School Pedagogy.
228. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 274 (2018).
229. 27 AM. JUR. 2D Employment Relationship § 9 (2018).
230. See 19 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 54:39 (4th ed. 2018).
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(as understood in contract theory) because there is no transfer of
rights from the professor to the law school. Rather, the professor
retains his or her rights, including the right to quit and take up
different employment at any time. Law professor contracts do gen-
erally reflect the economic efficiency theory, in that law schools of-
fer and professors accept only what is needed to bring the parties to
agreement, thus "maximizing individual and social gains.'23 1 How-
ever, this is not sufficient to transform such agreements into genu-
ine contracts.
With many other agreements examined here, including academic
oaths, honor codes, student handbooks, syllabi, and course policies,
one party has such a dominant position in the negotiations that the
resulting agreements cannot be said to include either offer or ac-
ceptance. Consideration too is absent. Mutual intent to contract
does not exist, and therefore there can be no contract, because such
"agreements" are handed down from above,232 and amount, at most,
to unenforceable contracts of adhesion due to "an absence of mean-
ingful choice.'233 These agreements fail to reflect the promise the-
ory, which allows a "free moral agent ... to bind his will," 23 4 and the
consent theory, which demands "the valid transfer of entitlements"
based on the parties' original voluntary consent.23 5 In such cases,
the resulting exchanges at best "maximize the joint gains ... from
transactions,'236 reflecting the economic efficiency theory of con-
tract.
In point of fact, the only contract in the law school context that
appears to reflect the democratic negotiations of independent par-
ties is the so-called learning contract. These contracts feature gen-
uine offer, acceptance, mutuality of intent, and consideration in the
form of exchanged promises. Learning contracts accurately demon-
strate the promise theory in that they reflect "the willing invocation
by a free moral agent of a convention that allows him to bind his
will."92 7 They further reflect the consent theory in that they result
from "the valid transfer of entitlements" based on the parties' orig-
inal voluntary consent.238 Finally, learning contracts also demon-
strate economic efficiency in that their democratic negotiation and
231. Zemach & Ben-Zvi, supra note 39, at 201.
232. See Leas, supra note 192, at 772-73.
233. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 274 (2018).
234. Fried, supra note 42, at 972-73.
235. Barnett, supra note 39, at 297.
236. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 54, at 544.
237. Fried, supra note 42, at 972-73.
238. Barnett, supra note 39, at 297.
Duquesne Law Review
rough equality of bargaining power represent "a vehicle for maxim-
izing individual and social gains."23 9
At any time, but particularly in these days of increasing antidem-
ocratic sentiment in the United States and abroad, such fairness of
bargaining power and the genuine contracts that result are perhaps
what the legal academy should aim for in governing its own affairs.
239. Zemach & Ben-Zvi, supra note 39, at 201.
Vol. 57
